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Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Aaron Thomas Johnson, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for the defendant-appellee.
MORGAN, Justice.
¶1

On 24 August 2016, defendant David Warren Taylor posted a string of angry
comments on his personal Facebook social media page. The messages conveyed
defendant’s forceful disagreement with a decision by the area’s elected District
Attorney, Ashley Welch, not to criminally prosecute the parents of a child after the
youngster’s death under unusual circumstances in Macon County. During the
diatribe, defendant consumed an unspecified, but apparently significant, quantity of
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beer. Most of defendant’s posts contained pointed, inflammatory, but essentially
political critiques of District Attorney Welch and various aspects of the Macon County
judicial system.1
¶2

Some of the posts contained troubling language. In one of them, defendant
promised that District Attorney Welch “will be the first to go” when a purportedly
impending “rebellion against our government” occurs. In another comment,
defendant declared that “[i]f [District Attorney Welch] won’t do anything, then the
death to her as well.” Defendant also made numerous references to the firearms that
he owned and his willingness to use them against law enforcement officers if he were
ever “raided.”

¶3

Within a couple of hours of publishing his final Facebook message, defendant
reconsidered the wisdom of broadcasting his unadulterated opinions on social media,
in what has been called “the modern public square.” Packingham v. North Carolina,
137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017). However, before defendant could delete the rant from
his Facebook page, one of his Facebook “friends”—a detective in the Macon County
Sheriff’s Office—became concerned that the messages harbored content more sinister
than intemperate venting. The detective took screenshots of defendant’s posted
comments and sent them to District Attorney Welch and the Macon County Sheriff,

For proper attribution, I recognize and appreciate the significant contribution which
Justice Earls has made to the introductory overview, the “Background,” and the “Analysis”
segments of this opinion.
1
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who then contacted the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation (SBI). The next
day, SBI investigators interviewed defendant at his office. That afternoon, defendant
was arrested and later indicted under N.C.G.S. § 14-16.7(a) for “knowingly and
willfully” threatening to kill a court officer. N.C.G.S. § 14-16.7(a) (2019). Defendant
was subsequently convicted of the charged offense. He received a suspended sentence
of 24 months of supervised probation and a $1,000 fine. Defendant appealed, and the
Court of Appeals concluded that his conviction violated the First Amendment. The
State has appealed to this Court.
¶4

At its core, this case presents a single question: Does the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution2 protect defendant from
being convicted solely for publishing the messages contained in his Facebook posts?
We conclude that it does, and therefore determine that his messages are shielded by
the First Amendment. Accordingly, while the Court of Appeals was correct to vacate
defendant’s conviction, there remain questions for a properly instructed jury, so we
reverse and remand the matter for a new trial.
I.

Background

A. The Facebook posts
¶5

Defendant and Welch were familiar with one another prior to the events which

This pertinent portion of the First Amendment states: “Congress shall make no law
. . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. . . .” U.S. Const. amend I.
2
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spawned this case. Defendant was a Macon County resident who supported Welch in
her campaign for the elected office of District Attorney. Defendant worked in an office
building which was close to the Macon County Courthouse where the two occasionally
would see each other during work breaks. Defendant and Welch were friendly, even
though their conversations often centered on “political” subjects.
¶6

Defendant’s favorable view of District Attorney Welch changed on 24 August
2016 when he learned that she would not be pursuing criminal charges against the
parents of a Macon County child who had died a few months earlier. Defendant’s
concerns were rooted in the tragic details of the child’s death. According to the
parents, the two-and-a-half-year-old boy had “some sniffles” when they tucked him
in for a nap. When the parents returned, the youngster was not breathing. The
parents claimed that they took their son directly to the hospital, but when they
arrived at the emergency room, the child was already deceased and “incredibly
decomposed.” Welch was concerned that the child had been “killed or neglected,” and
consequently ordered an autopsy. To Welch’s surprise, the parents’ account was
confirmed. The autopsy determined that the child’s death and subsequent rapid
physical decomposition did not result from any maltreatment or abuse. Lacking
evidence of criminal conduct, Welch declined to press charges against the child’s
parents.

¶7

When defendant learned of District Attorney Welch’s decision to refrain from
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indicting the parents, he was demonstrably skeptical. He described the
representation that the child had “died of a virus” as “a load of “F**king shit.”
Defendant utilized the social media site Facebook as the primary vehicle by which to
express his frustration. Defendant initiated a litany of comments on his assessment
of the situation with the following Facebook entry:3
[Defendant]: So I learned today that the couple Who
brought their child Into that er whom had been dead to the
point that the er room had to be closed off due to the smell
of the dead child Will face no Charges. I regret the day I
voted for the new DA with this outcome. This is totally
sickening to know that a child, whether by Ashley Welch’s
decision or not is not granted this type of Protection in our
court system. Im tired of standing back and seeing how our
judicial system works. I voted for it to change and
apparently it never will. With this people question why a
rebellion against our government is coming? I hope those
that are friends with her share my post because she will be
the first to go, period and point made.
In response, a few of defendant’s Facebook friends communicated their shared
agreement with defendant’s views. Defendant himself then resumed his commentary:
[Defendant]: Sick is not the word for it. This folks is how
the government and the judicial system works, Now U
wonder why I say if I am raided for whatever reason like
the guy on smoke rise was. When the deputy ask me is it
worth it. I would say with a Shotgun Pointed at him and a
ar15 in the other arm was it worth to him? Who cares what
happens to the person I meet at the door. I’m sure he won’t.
I would open every gun I have. I would rather be carried by
six than judged by twelve. This folks is how politicians
Given the subject matter of this case and the relevance of defendant’s exact posting,
we have only minimally altered his quotes to ensure they are understandable.
3
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want u to believe is ok. Im tired of it. What I do Training
wise from this point is ur fault. And yes I know I have
friends on [Facebook] whom see this. I hope they do! Death
to our so called judicial system since it only works for those
that are guilty! U want me come and take me.
When one of his Facebook friends expressed surprise that these events could occur in
Macon County, defendant responded, “This is how politics works. That’s why my
harsh words to her and any other that will Listen and share it To her [Facebook]
page.” Another member of defendant’s Facebook network called for “vigilante justice,”
which was punctuated by markedly numerous exclamation marks. Defendant
replied:
If that what it takes[.] I will give them both the [mountain]
justice they deserve. Regardless of what the law or courts
say. I’m tired of this political bullshit. If our head
prosecutor won’t do anything then the death to her as well.
Yea I said it. Now raid my house for communicating threats
and see what they meet. After all those that flip Together
swim together. Although this isn’t a house or pond they
want to fish in.
The author of the “vigilante justice” comment posted that he was “still waiting.”
Again, defendant responded:
For what [ ]? [District Attorney Welch] to reply? She won’t
because she is being paid a 6 digit income standing Outside
the courthouse smoking a cigarette. She won’t try a case
unless it gets her TV time. Typical politician. Notice that
none of them has responded yet? Although I’m sure My
house is being Monitored right about now! I really hope
They are ready for what meet them at the front door.
Something tells Me they aren’t!
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As other Facebook observers continued to “like” his posts and comment on them,
defendant published four more messages:
It can start at my house. Hell this has to start somewhere.
If the courts won’t do it as have been proven. Then yes it Is
up to the people to administer justice! I’m always game to
do so. They make new ammo everyday! Maybe you need to
learn what being free is verse being a puppet of the
government. If u did u would might actually be happy! I
think we both know of someone who will like this Comment
Or Like this post.
I know people who said the er room had to be shut down
because the smell of they dead kid stunk up the entire er
room. Our DA and Police department chose not to press
charges. Yea that’s the facts. Welcome to America. The
once great great nation.
Don’t get me started on this. The court system and Most
importantly western nc justice system is useless. It’s all
about money to the courts than it Is about justice. It is time
for old Time mtn justice! Yes [ ] I said it. Now let Them
knock on my door.
[ ] don’t get me Started about The Tony Curtis killing. Of
Course No charges will Be brought against him. He is what
the county considers to be a upstanding citizen of the
community. Typical politics at its best. What he did was no
different to the killing On 411 north over a year ago. What
was his name? Fouts?
¶8

On the following day of 25 August 2016, the Macon County Sheriff’s Office, the
Macon County Courthouse, and District Attorney Welch herself all took precautions
to ensure her safety. Additional deputies were stationed within and around the
courthouse. Welch stopped walking through the office building where defendant
worked. Further, she asked a realtor who had posted a video tour of Welch’s home to
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remove the video, fearing that it could reveal identifying information from which
defendant could glean Welch’s address.
¶9

Later in the same day, a Special Agent from the SBI went to defendant’s
workplace to interview defendant. During the meeting, defendant reiterated his
complaint that “no charges were brought against the parents” of the child who died,
which defendant described as “sickening.” Defendant claimed that he did not mean
to threaten or harm District Attorney Welch and that he deleted the social media
posts because “he was friends with someone on Facebook who was friends with the
parents’ children.” He then apologized for any concern that his posts had raised and
asked the SBI agent to tell Welch that defendant was sorry.

¶ 10

Shortly after the interview concluded, police arrested defendant at his place of
employment. Defendant was subsequently indicted pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 14-16.7(a)
for “knowingly and willfully mak[ing] a[ ] threat to inflict serious bodily injury upon
or to kill a[ ] . . . court officer[.]”
B. The trial

¶ 11

Defendant’s trial began in January 2018. After the State concluded the
presentation of its case, defendant moved to dismiss the matter on First Amendment
grounds. He argued that the State had not shown that he had communicated any
“true threat” against District Attorney Welch, which he contended was a threshold
requirement in order to obtain a criminal conviction under N.C.G.S. § 14-16.7(a),
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consistent with First Amendment protections. Defendant defined a true threat as “a
statement in which the defendant means to communicate a serious intention of
committing an act of unlawful violence against a particular person.” The trial court
denied defendant’s dismissal motion. Defendant did not elect to present evidence on
his own behalf. He renewed his motion to dismiss on First Amendment grounds at
the close of all of the evidence, which the trial court again denied.
¶ 12

During the jury charge conference, defendant requested jury instructions
which distinguished “political hyperbole” from “true threats,” based on his contention
that the First Amendment forbade his conviction in the event that the jury could not
find that he had communicated a true threat. The State objected to the proposed
instruction, as it asserted that the “proper venue” and time for defendant to raise any
First Amendment arguments would be “if upon conviction to take that up on appeal.”
The State also argued that the First Amendment was irrelevant because N.C.G.S.
§ 14-16.7(a) reflected the General Assembly’s determination that “making any
threats towards . . . court officials . . . is unacceptable.” In the State’s view,
defendant’s proposed jury instructions would impermissibly “rewrite [N.C.G.S. § 1416.7(a)] to comport with his interpretation of the First Amendment requirements.”
Instead, the State asked the trial court to instruct the jury in accordance with the
language of the statute, proposing an instruction which contained the phrase that
there was “no requirement of proof to show that the threat was made in a manner
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and under circumstances which would cause a reasonable person to believe it is likely
to be carried out.” The trial court agreed with the State’s stance and therefore
instructed the jury that in order to convict defendant, the State only needed to prove
that defendant “knowingly and willfully made a threat to kill the alleged victim.”
¶ 13

The jury found defendant guilty of the charged offense. The trial court
sentenced defendant to a term of incarceration of 6 to 17 months, which was
suspended upon 24 months of supervised probation and payment of a fine of
$1,000.00. Defendant appealed.
C. The Court of Appeals opinion

¶ 14

Upon defendant’s appeal, the Court of Appeals panel unanimously agreed that
the First Amendment required the State to prove that defendant communicated a
true threat. State v. Taylor, 270 N.C. App. 514, 517 (2020). In vacating the verdict
and judgment entered against defendant at trial, the lower appellate court also
unanimously agreed that N.C.G.S. § 14-16.7(a) was unconstitutional as applied to
convict defendant for his Facebook posts. Id. The Court of Appeals concluded that the
State was required to prove that defendant possessed both a general and specific
intent to threaten District Attorney Welch in order to establish that defendant had
communicated a true threat. In so concluding, the Court of Appeals held that in order
to prove that defendant communicated a true threat, the State was required to prove
that he communicated a statement which was objectively threatening and that he
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subjectively intended to threaten District Attorney Welch when he posted the
messages on Facebook.4 The State needed to establish the objective component that
defendant’s statements “would be understood by people hearing or reading it in
context as a serious expression of an intent to kill or injure” District Attorney Welch
and that defendant “intended that the statement be understood as a threat” in order
to satisfy the subjective component. Id. at 557 (quoting United States v. Bagdasarian,
652 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2011)). The State failed, in the view of the Court of
Appeals, to prove the existence of either prong because (1) defendant’s Facebook posts
were “simply not [ ] statement[s] that a reasonable person would understand as
Defendant expressing a serious intent to kill D.A. Welch,” and (2) “the record evidence
could not have supported a finding that Defendant's intent in posting his comments
was to cause D.A. Welch to believe Defendant was going to kill her.” Id. at 581.5 The

For ease of reading, we use the terms “objective” and “subjective,” and their
derivatives, throughout this opinion, rather than the terms “general intent” and “specific
intent,” to refer to the two elements that defendant alleges that the State must prove in order
to convict him for communicating a true threat.
5 Additionally, the Court of Appeals held that the First Amendment’s “true threats”
requirement was an essential element of N.C.G.S. § 14-16.7(a). Because “[i]t is well
established that a defendant cannot receive a fair, i.e., constitutional, trial, unless all
essential elements of the crime charged are submitted to the jury and found beyond a
reasonable doubt,” the lower appellate court concluded that the trial court’s failure to give
any instruction incorporating First Amendment requirements rendered defendant’s
conviction as constitutionally infirm. Taylor, 270 N.C. App. at 541. The State has conceded
this point and agrees that defendant’s conviction must be vacated. Accordingly, the only
question before this Court is whether to affirm the Court of Appeals decision vacating the
trial court judgment and remanding for entry of a judgment of acquittal, or to reverse the
Court of Appeals decision, vacate the trial court’s judgment, and remand for a new trial.
4
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Court of Appeals majority ultimately adopted defendant’s argument that his social
media messages were protected by the First Amendment because the State did not
prove that defendant communicated a true threat against the elected official Welch.
¶ 15

In a concurring opinion, a member of the Court of Appeals panel reached the
same outcome in the case as the majority of the panel did, concluding as a matter of
law that defendant’s messages were not objectively threatening. Id. at 591 (Dietz, J.
concurring in part).

¶ 16

We granted the State’s petition for discretionary review.
II.

Analysis

A. Applicable free speech principles
¶ 17

The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, as incorporated to apply to
the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, provides
that the government “shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S.
Const. amend. I. This provision serves as a bulwark against governmental action
which threatens the robust exchange of ideas that is “the indispensable condition[ ]
of nearly every other form of freedom.” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937),
overruled on other grounds by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). Laws
restricting speech “because of disapproval of the ideas expressed” are typically
unconstitutional. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); see also
Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648–49 (1984) (“Regulations which permit the
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Government to discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be
tolerated under the First Amendment.”). “Content-based regulations”—including
criminal statutes which target speech on the basis of its content—“are presumptively
invalid.” R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382.
¶ 18

However, “our society, like other free but civilized societies, has permitted
restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas.” Id. at 382–83. Certain
categories of expression “can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated
because of their constitutionally proscribable content.” Id. at 383. These
“constitutionally proscribable” categories of expression include obscenity, Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), defamation, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964), fighting words, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942),
incitement, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), and true threats, Watts v.
United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). If defendant’s Facebook posts contained any true
threats, then it is indisputable that he could be criminally punished for the content
of his messages, provided that “the basis for the content discrimination consists
entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable.” R.A.V.,
505 U.S. at 388. If Taylor’s Facebook posts did not contain any true threats, then his
expression is shielded by the First Amendment. We are therefore compelled to
identify the characteristics of true threats which allow the State to prosecute one kind
of expression understood to be entirely lacking in constitutional value, while
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preventing N.C.G.S. § 14-16.7(a) from “becoming an instrument for the suppression
of those ‘vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks’ which must
be protected if the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments are to
prevail.” Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 277 (1971) (quoting New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). Speakers need clarity on the type of
communication which constitutes a true threat so that they can engage in protected
First Amendment activities while ensuring their speech is lawful.
¶ 19

Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court of the United States has ever
explicitly defined the scope of the true threats exception to the First Amendment.
However, our analysis is guided by the high court’s articulation of general principles
in the few cases addressing the existence of true threats which it has decided, as well
as the many cases involving other categories of constitutionally forbidden speech.

¶ 20

As the Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly emphasized, when
tasked with drawing the boundary line between constitutionally protected speech and
criminally proscribable expression, the risk of hampering public debate should be a
court’s foremost concern. “Our profound national commitment to the free exchange of
ideas, as enshrined in the First Amendment, demands . . . an area of breathing space
so that protected speech is not discouraged.” Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v.
Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686 (1989) (extraneity omitted). This demand for
“breathing space” is especially pronounced when governmental action risks targeting
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or dissuading “[s]peech concerning public affairs,” which is “more than selfexpression; it is the essence of self-government.” Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452
(2011). See also Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449,
457 (2007) (“In drawing that line [between protected and proscribable expression],
the First Amendment requires us to err on the side of protecting political speech
rather than suppressing it.”). To assure adequate “breathing space,” the Court has
“narrowed the scope of the traditional categorical exceptions” to the First
Amendment, even though the Court continues to recognize their existence. R.A.V.,
505 U.S. at 383.
¶ 21

In deciding whether the First Amendment allows defendant to be convicted
under N.C.G.S. § 14-16.7(a) for his Facebook posts, we “interpret the language that
[the General Assembly] chose ‘against the background of a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open.’ ” Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (quoting
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). The various cases which
expound upon this principle convey a clear message that we must avoid a definition
of the true threats exception to the First Amendment which sweeps too broadly.
Unduly enlarging any categorical exception to the First Amendment “would have
substantial costs in discouraging the uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate that
the First Amendment is intended to protect.” Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 48
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(1975) (Marshall, J., concurring) (extraneity omitted). Our examination and
interpretation of the limited case law expressly addressing the true threats doctrine
must respect and revere these fundamental First Amendment principles.
1. The true threats exception
¶ 22

The Supreme Court of the United States first recognized the true threats
exception to the First Amendment in Watts v. United States. In Watts, the
defendant—an

eighteen-year-old

Black

protestor—attended

a

rally

at

the

Washington Monument, where he participated in a discussion group about police
brutality. 394 U.S. at 706. During this discussion, the defendant declared that
I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I
have got to report for my physical this Monday coming. I
am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first
man I want to get in my sights is [President Lyndon Baines
Johnson].6 They are not going to make me kill my black
brothers.
Id. (extraneity omitted) (emphasis added). Befitting the era, one member of the
discussion group was an investigator from the Army Counter Intelligence Corps. Id.
The next day, the defendant was arrested by Secret Service agents. He was ultimately
indicted and convicted under a federal statute which prohibited individuals from
“knowingly and willfully . . . (making) any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily
harm upon the President of the United States[.]” Id. at 705.

6

The defendant in Watts referred to the President as “LBJ.”
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¶ 23

Upon his appeal, the defendant argued that his statement “was a kind of very
crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to the President” and was thus
shielded by the First Amendment. Id. at 707. In a per curiam opinion, the preeminent
forum agreed with the defendant and held that the First Amendment barred his
conviction. The Supreme Court of the United States began by affirming that “[t]he
Nation undoubtedly has a valid, even an overwhelming, interest in protecting the
safety of its Chief Executive and in allowing him to perform his duties without
interference from threats of physical violence.” Id. Notwithstanding this
“overwhelming” interest, the high Court concluded that the challenged federal
statute could only be applied consistently with First Amendment requirements if
prosecutors could prove that the defendant made a “true threat” against the
President. Id. at 708. In its opinion, the Supreme Court of the United States did not
discuss the difference between a true threat and protected political hyperbole;
instead, the high court simply concluded that “[t]aken in context, and regarding the
expressly conditional nature of the statement and the reaction of the listeners, we do
not see how [the defendant’s statement] could be interpreted” as anything other than
constitutionally protected political speech. Id.

¶ 24

The Watts decision contains three insights that are germane to our analysis in
the instant case. First, Watts confirms that in defining and applying the true threats
exception, a statute criminalizing speech “must be interpreted with the commands of

STATE V. TAYLOR
2021-NCSC-164
Opinion of the Court

the First Amendment clearly in mind.” Id. at 707. Second, Watts instructs us that
even if a state’s interest in protecting its public officials is “overwhelming,” the First
Amendment interest in protecting speakers who engage in controversial but
constitutionally permissible speech is even more substantial. Id. In every case
interpreting the permissible scope of a statute “which makes criminal a form of true
speech . . . [w]hat is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally
protected speech.” Id. Third, Watts provides that in order to determine whether a
defendant’s particular statements contain a true threat, a court must consider (1) the
context in which the statement was made, (2) the nature of the language the
defendant deployed, and (3) the reaction of the listeners upon hearing the statement,
although no single factor is dispositive. Id. at 708.
2. True threats and subjective intent
¶ 25

The Supreme Court of the United States next directly considered the true
threats exception to the First Amendment in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
In Black, the Supreme Court examined a Virginia statute criminalizing the act of
burning a cross with “an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons.” Id. at 347.
The case was before the high tribunal by virtue of consolidated appeals from three
defendants who were convicted under the enacted law for burning crosses: one who
burned a cross during a Ku Klux Klan rally and two who attempted to burn a cross
on the lawn of their Black neighbor. Id. at 348–50. The defendants challenged their
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convictions under the Virginia statute on two grounds. First, they argued that the
statute was facially unconstitutional because it selectively discriminated against one
specific type of speech—cross burning—on the basis of its “distinctive message,” in
violation of the First Amendment as interpreted in R.A.V.7 Id. at 351. Second, the
defendants argued that a provision of the statute which made the act of cross burning
prima facie evidence of a defendant’s intent to intimidate rendered the statute
unconstitutional. Id.
¶ 26

In a fractured set of opinions, a plurality of the Supreme Court of the United
States rejected the defendants’ facial challenge but held that the prima facie evidence
provision was unconstitutionally overbroad. After surveying the pervasive use of
cross burnings as a tool for enforcing racial oppression across the South, the plurality
examined the First Amendment implications of Virginia’s statute. Id. at 357. The
high court began with the fundamental principle that the First Amendment
“ordinarily denies a State the power to prohibit dissemination of social, economic and

In R.A.V., the Supreme Court of the United States held that the First Amendment’s
general prohibition on content-based speech restrictions precludes a government from
regulating speech “based on hostility—or favoritism—towards the underlying message
expressed,” even when all of the regulated speech is contained within a broader category of
proscribable speech. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992). Thus, while
a government could prohibit certain forms of speech “because of their constitutionally
proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.),” a government could not prohibit only
certain speech falling within one of the proscribable categories on the basis of something
other than the feature which makes the expression proscribable in the first place. Id. at 383–
84 (“[T]he government may proscribe libel; but it may not make the further content
discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the government.”).
7
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political doctrine which a vast majority of its citizens believes to be false and fraught
with evil consequence.” Id. at 358 (extraneity omitted) (quoting Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). The Supreme Court then
acknowledged the existence of well-established categorical exceptions to this general
rule, explaining that the First Amendment did not prevent the government from
“regulat[ing] certain categories of expression” which are utterly lacking in
constitutional value, including true threats. Id.
“True threats” encompass those statements where the
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an
intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular
individual or group of individuals. The speaker need not
actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a
prohibition on true threats protect[s] individuals from the
fear of violence and from the disruption that fear
engenders, in addition to protecting people from the
possibility
that
the
threatened
violence
will
occur. Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable
sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker
directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the
intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.
Id. at 359–60 (extraneity omitted).
¶ 27

The plurality held that the First Amendment’s general prohibition on contentbased discrimination did not prevent Virginia from singling out for regulation one
“particularly virulent form of intimidation,” because “[u]nlike the statute at issue in
R.A.V., the Virginia statute does not single out for opprobrium only that speech
directed toward . . . specified disfavored topics.” Id. at 362–63. This determination
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was based upon the plurality’s rationale that it was acceptable for the government to
target one subset of a broader category of proscribable speech—cross burning—if the
focus was motivated by characteristics which made the broader category of speech—
true threats—proscribable in the first place. Id. at 362 (“[T]he First Amendment
permits content discrimination based on the very reasons why the particular class of
speech at issue is proscribable.”) (extraneity omitted). However, the plurality
concluded that the “prima facie evidence provision . . . renders the statute
unconstitutional” because it “permits the Commonwealth to arrest, prosecute, and
convict a person based solely on the fact of cross burning itself.” Id. at 364–65.
¶ 28

While the scope, meaning, and influence of the Black plurality opinion is
debatable, it appears clear that Black authorizes the government to regulate a
narrower subset of one category of constitutionally proscribable speech without
prohibiting all speech which falls within that category, provided that the reason for
targeting the subset of proscribable speech is the feature which pushes the broader
category outside of the ambit of the First Amendment. Similarly, it also appears clear
that the State need not prove that a defendant intended to actually carry out an act
of violence in order to obtain a conviction of the defendant for communicating a threat.
However, it remains unclear, and hence, a matter of dispute in cases such as the
present one, as to whether Black establishes that proof of a defendant’s subjective
intent to threaten violence is a prerequisite to obtaining a constitutionally valid
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conviction under any criminal statute and in every possible circumstance.
¶ 29

Defendant here argues that Black establishes such a constitutional rule that
the government must prove a defendant’s subjective intent as an element of the
charged crime, while the State contends, on the other hand, that the plurality’s
reasoning was restricted to Virginia’s unique cross-burning statute. Both parties find
support for their respective positions in cases from other jurisdictions interpreting
Black. Compare Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1116 (“The Court held in [Black] that
under the First Amendment . . . [i]t is [ ] not sufficient that objective observers would
reasonably perceive [a defendant’s] speech as a threat of injury or death”) with United
States v. White, 810 F.3d 212, 219 (4th Cir. 2016) (reading Black as not disturbing its
longstanding conclusion that “the Constitution [does not] require[ ] the Government
to prove that a defendant subjectively intended the recipient of the communication to
understand it as threatening” to prove a true threat). The Justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States themselves appear to disagree about the interpretation of
the plurality opinion in Black. Compare Perez v. Fla., 137 S. Ct. 853, 855 (2017)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (“[Watts and Black] strongly
suggest that it is not enough that a reasonable person might have understood the
words as a threat—a jury must find that the speaker actually intended to convey a
threat.”) with Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723, 765 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“The Court's fractured opinion in Black . . . says little about whether an
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intent-to-threaten requirement is constitutionally mandated” in all cases). Both
interpretations of Black are plausible.
¶ 30

The parties first dispute the meaning of the plurality’s statement that “ ‘[t]rue
threats encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular
individual or group of individuals.” Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (emphasis added).
Defendant construes this sentence to mean that an individual communicates a true
threat only when he or she speaks with the specific intent of threatening the listener.
The State interprets this sentence to mean that an individual communicates a true
threat whenever the individual intentionally communicates any statement which
objectively contains a “serious expression of an intent” to threaten, regardless of
whether the individual specifically intended to threaten the listener.

¶ 31

Defendant’s narrower interpretation strikes some balance between the First
Amendment’s express safeguard of free speech and the government’s necessary
protection of society’s members from acts of violence. In our view, the most “natural
reading” of the language in dispute “is that the speaker intends to convey everything
following the phrase means to communicate, rather than just to convey words that
someone else would interpret as a ‘serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence.’ ” United States v. Heineman, 767 F.3d 970, 980 (10th Cir. 2014)
(citation omitted); see also United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 631 (9th Cir. 2005)
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(“A natural reading of this language embraces not only the requirement that the
communication itself be intentional, but also the requirement that the speaker intend
for his language to threaten the victim.”)
¶ 32

By contrast, the State’s argument that the plurality meant only that a speaker
“must intend to make the forbidden communication” is broader and more direct. The
State’s approach hinges solely upon the speaker’s volition, or lack thereof, in
conveying the message, thus negating the need for a further probe into the speaker’s
intent to execute the described act which may or may not result in an improper
imposition upon the speaker’s First Amendment right to free speech. “If there is no
requirement that the defendant intend the victim to feel threatened, it would be
bizarre to argue that the defendant must still intend to carry out the threat.”
Heineman, 767 F.3d 970, 980–81 (10th Cir. 2014). “The clear import of this definition
is that only intentional threats are criminally punishable consistently with the First
Amendment.” Cassel, 408 F.3d at 631.

¶ 33

The parties next dispute the significance of the Supreme Court’s statement
that “[i]ntimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of
true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the
intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.” Id. at 359 (emphasis
added). Defendant asserts that this legal observation identifies the characteristic
which transforms protected speech into a proscribable true threat: the speaker’s
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subjective intent to threaten. The State counters that this explanatory reference does
nothing more than define a category of true threats—namely, intimidation—which is
manifested when the speaker intends to threaten the listener. Under this
interpretation, the First Amendment does not necessarily require proof of the
speaker’s subjective intent in every case involving threats. We regard Black to hold
that a speaker’s subjective intent to threaten is the pivotal feature separating
constitutionally protected speech from constitutionally proscribable true threats.
3. Applying subjective intent to the true threats exception
¶ 34

Under the First Amendment, the State may not punish an individual for
speaking based upon the contents of the message communicated. This Court
recognizes that there are limited exceptions to this principle, as the State is permitted
to criminalize certain categories of expression which, by their very nature, lack
constitutional value. However, these categories must have narrow parameters to
ensure that the State does not target or dissuade constitutionally protected
expression based upon the controversial nature of the speech. Statutes which
criminalize pure speech but do not require any proof of the defendant’s intent may
chill the utterance of protected speech by punishing morally innocent speakers and
inducing self-censorship. Based upon these conclusions, we define a true threat as an
objectively threatening statement communicated by a party which possesses the
subjective intent to threaten a listener or identifiable group.
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¶ 35

When an individual communicates a true threat, the First Amendment allows
the State to punish the individual because a true threat is not “the type of speech
[which is] indispensable to decision making in a democracy.” First Nat. Bank of Bos.
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978). A true threat stems from the opposite form of
speech, in that it reflects an individual’s effort to settle political disputes by violence
rather than deliberation. Shackelford v. Shirley, 948 F.2d 935, 938 (5th Cir. 1991)
(“[E]xpression has special value only in the context of ‘dialogue’: . . . It is not plausible
to uphold the right to use words as projectiles where no exchange of views is
involved.”) (quoting L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 12–8 at 836–37 (2d ed.
1988)). An individual who communicates a true threat hopes to influence public
decision-making not through legitimate means—the painstaking work of convincing
fellow citizens or political leaders to change their actions or views—but by “creat[ing]
a pervasive fear in victims that they are a target of violence.” Black, 538 U.S. at 360;
see also Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that when a defendant
makes a true threat, it is “not staking out a position of debate but of threatened
demise”).

¶ 36

The true threats exception emanates from the recognition that certain speech
acts “do[ ] not in any sense contribute to the values the first amendment was designed
to advance,” Shackelford, 948 F.2d at 938, because these speech acts form “no

STATE V. TAYLOR
2021-NCSC-164
Opinion of the Court

essential part of any exposition of ideas.” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 572 (1942). But it is inconsistent with the First Amendment to define the true
threats category so broadly as to discourage constitutionally valued speech. There is
existent peril when courts are challenged to distinguish between protected speech
and proscribable speech, for our legal forums cannot permit the government to
impinge upon the “free trade in ideas[,] even”—especially—“ideas that the
overwhelming majority of people might find distasteful or discomforting.” Black, 538
U.S. at 358. We thus interpret all exceptions to the First Amendment as necessary
but narrow departures from the “bedrock principle” that “the government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive
or disagreeable.” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
¶ 37

The First Amendment interest in fostering speech is particularly substantial
when, as in the present case, the speech in question is a message critiquing the
manner in which an elected official has chosen to carry out the position’s public
duties. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (“[S]peech on public issues
occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled
to special protection.”) (extraneity omitted). The First Amendment’s protection of the
right to criticize public officials safeguards our democracy by keeping elected
representatives accountable to the people whom they serve. To ensure that this right
can be vigorously and unreservedly exercised, the First Amendment constrains us to

STATE V. TAYLOR
2021-NCSC-164
Opinion of the Court

reject

any

interpretation

of

N.C.G.S.

§ 14-16.7(a)

which

would

“chill[

]

constitutionally protected political speech because of the possibility that the [State]
will prosecute—and potentially convict—somebody engaging only in lawful political
speech at the core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect.” Black, 538
U.S. at 365.
¶ 38

The State contends that the subjective intent requirement is “inconsistent with
the purposes of the true-threats exception to the First Amendment.” We fully agree
that the true threats doctrine, like all categorical exceptions to the First Amendment,
permits the State to criminalize speech which is “of such slight social value . . . that
any benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality.” R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383.

¶ 39

The State also submits that requiring prosecutors to establish a defendant’s
subjective intent will “hinder the State’s ability to protect its citizens from unlawful
threats of violence.” While we do not diminish the magnitude and legitimacy of the
State’s concern, nonetheless its desire to totally eliminate the element of a
defendant’s subjective intent must yield to the constitutional freedoms shielded by
the First Amendment and recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States. In
tandem with the preeminent tribunal’s precedent, our interpretation of the First
Amendment prompts us to decline the State’s invitation to forsake a subjective intent
requirement. As in Watts, our recognition of the State’s “overwhelming[ ] interest in
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protecting the safety of its [public officers] and in allowing [them] to perform [their]
duties without interference from threats of physical violence,” Watts, 394 U.S at 707,
is no substitute for the First Amendment’s demand that we restrain the State from
criminalizing protected expression.
¶ 40

Finally, the State argues that applying Watts and Black in a manner which
requires the government to prove a defendant’s subjective intent “would throw the
true-threats exception out of step with the rest of the First Amendment,” because
other constitutionally proscribable categories of speech do not require proof of a
defendant’s subjective intent or state of mind. This legal deduction is not a definitive
declaration of the status of the law in this area.8

¶ 41

Even if the State is correct in its assertion that there remain areas of First
Amendment law where a speaker’s intent or state of mind is not central to the
constitutional inquiry, our decision to require proof of subjective intent in the true
threats context does not rise to a level of appellate law upheaval nor create any
academic discord that does not already exist.

¶ 42

Based on the foregoing analysis, and consistent with our interpretation of the
Although there is not a consensus, many scholars agree that the First Amendment
generally requires at least some consideration of a defendant’s intent or state of mind when
examining the permissible scope of civil or criminal liability for speech acts. See, e.g., Leslie
Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1633, 1641 (2013)
(“The Supreme Court has recognized several categories of speech that the First Amendment
does not protect, such as defamation, incitement, threats, obscenity, child pornography,
fraud, and fighting words. . . . Virtually all of these categories are defined by reference to the
speaker's state of mind.”).
8
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First Amendment and cited relevant precedents, we determine that the State is
required to prove both an objective and a subjective element in order to convict
defendant under N.C.G.S. § 14-16.7(a).
B. Sufficiency of the evidence
¶ 43

In determining whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the State
presented insufficient evidence to meet its burden on both the objective and subjective
prongs, this Court must employ the elements previously discussed in order to
determine if defendant communicated a true threat against District Attorney Welch.
1.

¶ 44

Independent review

“[I]n cases raising First Amendment issues . . . an appellate court has an
obligation to make an independent examination of the whole record in order to make
sure that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free
expression.” Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984)
(extraneity omitted). This obligation supplements rather than supplants the analysis
that we typically utilize when reviewing a trial court’s decision. In the context of a
libel suit, this Court has explained that independent whole record review is not
“inherently inconsistent with the principle that a court, on a motion for directed
verdict or [judgment notwithstanding the verdict], must determine whether the
evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, is sufficient as a
matter of law to be submitted to the jury.” Desmond v. News and Observer Publ’g Co.,
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375 N.C. 21, 44, n.16 (2020) (extraneity omitted). The same principle is applicable in
matters in which we examine a trial court’s decision to deny a defendant’s motion to
dismiss in a criminal case.
¶ 45

Independent whole record review does not empower an appellate court to
ignore a trial court’s factual determinations. In this regard, an appellate court is not
entitled to “make its own findings of fact and credibility determinations, or overrule
those of the trier of fact.” Desmond, 375 N.C. at 44, n.16. To the extent that the Court
of Appeals failed to “defer[ ] to the jury's findings on . . . historical facts [and]
credibility determinations,” United States v. Hanna, 293 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir.
2002), the State is correct regarding the basic introductory determinations that the
Court of Appeals erred in its application of independent whole record review.

¶ 46

This error can be illustrated by considering the words at issue in this case.
Some of the most strident language employed by defendant in his criticism of the
elected district attorney, which defendant readily admitted that defendant posted on
his social media page, included these statements:
•
•

•

I hope those that are friends with her [the elected
district attorney] share my post because she will be
the first to go, period and point made.
When the deputy ask me is it worth it. I would say
with a Shotgun Pointed at him and a ar15 in the
other arm was it worth to him? Who cares what
happens to the person I meet at the door. I’m sure he
won’t. I would open every gun I have. . . . Death to
our so called judicial system . . . .
This is how politics works. That’s why my harsh
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•

•

•

¶ 47

words to her and any other that will Listen and
share it To her [social media] page.
If that [vigilante justice] what it takes [ ].9 I will give
them both [the elected district attorney and “any
other that will Listen”]10 the [mountain] justice they
deserve. . . . If our head prosecutor won’t do anything
then the death to her as well. Yea I said it. Now raid
my house for communicating threats and see what
they meet. . . .
It can start at my house. Hell this has to start
somewhere. If the courts won’t do it as have been
proven. Then yes it Is up to the people to administer
justice! I’m always game to do so. They make new
ammo everyday!
It is time for old Time mtn justice! Yes [ ] I said it.
Now let Them knock on my door.

While all of defendant’s words may be political hyperbole, and hence, protected
speech, defendant’s social media utterances do not represent mere political hyperbole
as a matter of law. Defendant’s statements should not be read in isolation and are
more properly considered in context; therefore, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the State, these statements would potentially be reasonably regarded by
a jury as constituting a true threat to inflict serious bodily injury upon or to kill the
elected district attorney. Defendant’s multiple uses of the word “death” in direct

The word “that” was utilized by defendant in lieu of the phrase “vigilante justice” in
response to an observer’s social media post who used the phrase “vigilante justice” in
supporting defendant’s views.
10 The reference to “both” made by defendant was included in the next social media
post which followed a social media post by him regarding two different persons: “. . . her and
any other that will Listen . . . .”
9
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reference to the elected district attorney and the judicial system in which she was
serving, defendant’s favorable reception to the exercise of “vigilante justice” and “old
time mountain justice” for those individuals who are a part of the court system,
defendant’s numerous representations of his willingness to utilize firearms to
accomplish his manifesto, defendant’s several expressions of bravado concerning his
commitment to employ firearms against any representative of the criminal justice
system, and defendant’s repeated expression of the hope that the elected district
attorney would become aware of defendant’s social media posts all combine to
warrant consideration by a jury as to whether defendant has issued a true threat to
inflict serious bodily injury upon or to kill the elected district attorney.
¶ 48

Because the question of whether the State presented substantial evidence of
each essential element of the offense charged so as to survive defendant’s motion to
dismiss is a question of law, we review a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s motion
to dismiss de novo. State v. Blagg, 377 N.C. 482, 2021-NCSC-66, ¶ 10. In contrast, in
ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, the trial court itself
need determine only whether there is substantial evidence
of each essential element of the crime and that the
defendant is the perpetrator. Substantial evidence is the
amount necessary to persuade a rational juror to accept a
conclusion. In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a criminal conviction, the evidence must be
considered in the light most favorable to the State; the
State is entitled to every reasonable intendment and every
reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom. In other
words, if the record developed at trial contains substantial
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evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, or a
combination, to support a finding that the offense charged
has been committed and that the defendant committed it,
the case is for the jury and the motion to dismiss should be
denied.
State v. Golder, 374 N.C. 238, 249–50 (2020) (extraneity omitted).
¶ 49

Justice Earls, our learned colleague who concurs in part and dissents in part
with our opinion, views our determination of the correctness of the trial court’s
decision to deny defendant’s motion to dismiss based upon the State’s presentation of
substantial evidence of the charged offense as an exercise of speculation on our part
which reaches a conclusion which she opines that the evidence does not support.
However, not only have we refrained from drawing such factual conclusions from the
evidence, but we have observed the well-established principle that “[t]he jury’s role is
to weigh evidence, assess witness credibility, assign probative value to the evidence
and testimony, and determine what the evidence proves or fails to prove.” State v.
Moore, 366 N.C. 100, 108 (2012) (emphasis added). Therefore, a jury is required to
have the opportunity to fulfill these responsibilities in the present case upon remand.

¶ 50

The bar to survive a defendant’s motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the
evidence is low, such that “[i]t is sometimes difficult to distinguish between evidence
sufficient to carry a case to the jury, and a mere scintilla, which only raises a suspicion
or possibility of the fact in issue.” State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 66 (1982) (quoting
State v. Johnson, 199 N.C. 429, 431 (1930)). However, “if there be any evidence
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tending to prove the fact in issue, or which reasonably conduces to its conclusion as a
fairly logical and legitimate deduction, and not merely such as raises a suspicion or
conjecture in regard to it, the case should be submitted to the jury.” Id. (emphasis
added) (quoting Johnson, 199 N.C. at 431); see also State v. Butler, 356 N.C. 141, 145
(2002) (“To be substantial, the evidence need not be irrefutable or uncontroverted; it
need only be such as would satisfy a reasonable mind as being ‘adequate to support a
conclusion.’ ” (quoting State v. Lucas, 353 N.C. 568, 581 (2001))). When considering a
motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence a trial court “should not be
concerned with the weight of the evidence.” Earnhardt, 307 N.C. at 67.
¶ 51

This oft-cited precedent reveals the great deference which our courts, whether
at the trial or appellate level, must give to the vital role of the citizens of our state’s
local communities who are selected to serve as jurors.11 “Once the [trial] court decides
that a reasonable inference of defendant's guilt may be drawn from the
circumstances, then it is for the jury to decide whether the facts, taken singly or in
combination, satisfy it beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is actually
guilty.” State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 379 (2000) (emphasis added) (extraneity
omitted). For this reason, “[i]n borderline or close cases, our courts have consistently

A role of the jury is “to act as the voice and conscience of the community . . . [and]
to temper the harshness of the law with the ‘commonsense judgment of the community.’ ”
State v. Scott, 314 N.C. 309, 311–12 (1985) (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530
(1975)).
11
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expressed a preference for submitting issues to the jury.” State v. Yisrael,
255 N.C. App. 184 (2017), aff’d per curiam, 371 N.C. 108 (2018); see also State v.
Blagg, 377 N.C. 482, 2021-NCSC-66, ¶ 12.
¶ 52

In applying the cited case law to the present case, it is clear that the duty of
the trial court was to determine whether there was substantial evidence of the
criminal offense of a threat against a court officer and substantial evidence that
defendant was the perpetrator of the offense, as the trial court considered the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State in order to ascertain if defendant’s
motion to dismiss should be allowed or denied. Since there was no dispute that
defendant created the social media posts at issue, and since these messages of
defendant constitute substantial evidence of a threat against the elected district
attorney when this evidence is viewed in the context of the State’s entitlement to
every reasonable intendment and inference to be taken from it, we therefore
determine that our legal precedent has firmly established that defendant’s motion to
dismiss was correctly denied and that the case should have been considered by the
jury. Once this modest standard of evidence was satisfied by the State, then a jury
composed of defendant’s neighboring citizens should have had the opportunity to
determine if defendant had made a true threat to the local district attorney.

¶ 53

In acknowledging the State’s concession that defendant’s conviction must be
vacated because of the trial court’s error in failing to properly instruct the jury
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concerning the operation of the First Amendment, the sole issue for this Court to
determine is whether to remand the matter to the trial court for, after vacating the
trial court’s judgment rendered pursuant to the conviction, entry of a judgment of
acquittal or a new trial. Because, as we have discussed above, the facts presented by
the State could have allowed a reasonable jury to conclude defendant uttered a true
threat, a properly instructed jury must be allowed to consider this question.
¶ 54

Accordingly, while we agree with the Court of Appeals’ decision to vacate
defendant’s conviction, there remain factual questions for a properly instructed jury
to determine. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals opinion that remands this
case to the trial court for entry of a judgment of acquittal, and instead we remand the
case to the trial court for a new trial in order to permit a jury composed of defendant’s
peers to determine whether defendant committed the criminal offense of making a
threat to inflict serious bodily injury upon or to kill a court officer because of the
exercise of that officer’s duties, in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-16.7.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Justice EARLS concurring in part, dissenting in part.

¶ 55

I concur in the portion of the majority opinion holding that, to convict a
defendant under N.C.G.S. § 14-16.7(a), the First Amendment requires the State to
prove both that the defendant has communicated a message that a reasonable
observer would understand to contain a threat of violence and that the defendant
communicated the message with the subjective intent to threaten an individual or
identifiable group. I write separately on this issue to offer two additional
observations. First, the common law principles articulated in Elonis v. United States,
575 U.S. 723 (2015) bolster the majority’s conclusion that a true threat requires proof
of the speaker’s subjective intent to threaten. Second, it is important to recognize the
tension inherent in the true threats doctrine in light of the First Amendment’s
broader purpose of fostering the conditions for democratic self-governance.

¶ 56

However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the State’s
evidence in this case was sufficient to withstand Taylor’s motion to dismiss. An
objectively reasonable observer viewing Taylor’s Facebook posts in their full context
could not understand his messages to contain a serious intention to inflict bodily
harm on District Attorney Welch. Further, even if the State had satisfied the objective
element, there is insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Taylor
subjectively intended to threaten District Attorney Welch with violence. The
majority’s decision to hold otherwise reflects a misapplication of the independent
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review standard which is inconsistent with the assiduous protection of free
expression the First Amendment demands.
I. Common law principles support the conclusion that attaching criminal
liability to purportedly threatening speech requires consideration of
the speaker’s subjective intent.
¶ 57

In Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723 (2015), the United States Supreme
Court considered a defendant’s challenge to his conviction under a federal statute
criminalizing the act of communicating threats across state lines. In his argument to
this Court, Taylor invoked Elonis for the proposition that to comport with the First
Amendment, criminal statutes targeting pure speech must be construed to
incorporate a heightened mens rea requirement. The State argued that because
Elonis was decided solely on statutory interpretation grounds, the decision was
entirely irrelevant. However, the common law principles Elonis was based on are
especially salient in the First Amendment context and support the conclusion that
statutes proscribing pure speech must be interpreted to incorporate a heightened
mens rea requirement.

¶ 58

The defendant in Elonis posted “self-styled ‘rap’ lyrics,” poems, and
photographs with “graphically violent language and imagery” on Facebook. Id. at
726–27. Some of the language and imagery was directed at the defendant’s employer.
Id. Other posts contained “crude, degrading, and violent material about [the
defendant’s] soon-to-be ex-wife,” including a post asking if the protective order his
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wife had obtained was “thick enough to stop a bullet.” Id. at 727–30. In the same post,
the defendant claimed he possessed “enough explosives to take care of the State Police
and the Sheriff’s Department.” Id. Another post read, “[e]nough elementary schools
in a ten mile radius to initiate the most heinous school shooting ever imagined And
hell hath no fury like a crazy man in a Kindergarten class The only question is . . .
which one?” Id. at 729. The defendant invoked his “freedom of speech” under the First
Amendment and asserted his messages were protected as artistic expression. Id.
¶ 59

Despite his disclaimers, the defendant in Elonis was indicted for “making
threats to injure patrons and employees of the park, his estranged wife, police officers,
a kindergarten class, and an FBI agent, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).” Id. at
731. As written, this federal statute applied to anyone who “transmit[ted] in
interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing . . . any threat to injure
the person of another.” Id. at 732. At trial, the defendant requested a jury instruction
stating that in order to convict him under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), “the government must
prove that he intended to communicate a true threat.” Id. at 731. The government
countered that “it was irrelevant whether [the defendant] intended the postings to be
threats.” Id. at 732. The trial court agreed with the government, the instruction was
not given, and the defendant was convicted. Id. The Third Circuit affirmed,
concluding that “the intent required by [18 U.S.C. § 875(c)] is only the intent to
communicate words that the defendant understands, and that a reasonable person
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would view as a threat.” Id. at 732.
¶ 60

In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the United States Supreme
Court reversed. According to the majority, although 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) “does not
indicate whether the defendant must intend that his communication contain a
threat,” Congress’s failure to “specify any required mental state . . . does not mean
that none exists.” Id. at 734. Instead, the majority invoked the longstanding “rule of
construction” that criminal statutes should be interpreted to “include broadly
applicable scienter requirements, even where the statute by its terms does not
contain them.” Id. (citing United States v. X–Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 70
(1994)). In the majority’s view, under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), “the crucial element
separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct is the threatening nature of the
communication.” Id. at 737 (cleaned up). Applying its own rule of statutory
construction, the majority read 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) as incorporating a requirement that
the defendant be at least reckless with regards to the possibility that the “contents
of” the communicated message contained a threat.1 Id. at 740.

¶ 61

In justifying the statutory presumption it was invoking, the Elonis majority
explained “that a defendant generally must know the facts that make his conduct fit

The majority vacated the defendant’s conviction and remanded the case without
deciding whether that scienter requirement could be satisfied by a showing of recklessness
alone, or if the government was required to prove a defendant possessed actual knowledge
that the message he or she communicated contained a threat. Elonis, 575 U.S. at 742.
1

STATE V. TAYLOR
2021-NCSC-164
Earls, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part

the definition of the offense, even if he does not know that those facts give rise to a
crime.” Id. at 735 (cleaned up). That is, a defendant must know he is engaging in the
type of conduct that is criminalized (in the defendant’s case, communicating a threat),
even if he or she does not know that the conduct gives rise to criminal liability. See
X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. at 72, n.3 (“Criminal intent serves to separate those
who understand the wrongful nature of their act from those who do not, but [intent]
does not require knowledge of the precise consequences that may flow from that act
once aware that the act is wrongful.”). This logic reflects a “basic principle underlying
the common law, namely, the importance of showing what Blackstone called ‘a vicious
will.’ ” Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191, 2196 (2019) (quoting 4 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England 21 (1769)). Accordingly, most criminal
offenses incorporate a scienter requirement to distinguish between the “morally
culpable” defendant who chooses to engage in wrongful conduct and the defendant
whose “otherwise innocent conduct” happens to be criminal. Elonis, 575 U.S. at 745
(Alito, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2196
(“The cases in which we have emphasized scienter’s importance in separating
wrongful from innocent acts are legion.”).
¶ 62

The need to distinguish between culpable and innocent conduct is heightened
when a statute criminalizes pure speech. Pure speech cannot ordinarily be made
criminal based solely upon the message the speaker conveys. That is a core First
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Amendment premise. To the extent there are recognized exceptions to this baseline
rule, it is never the act of speaking alone that statutes like N.C.G.S. § 14-16.7(a)
criminalize. It is the act of speaking a particular kind of message which, by its very
nature, removes the speech from the First Amendment’s ambit. The State is allowed
to convert an act which is ordinarily non-criminal—an act which individuals
ordinarily possess a hallowed constitutional right to engage in—into criminal conduct
solely because of the substance of the message communicated. An intent requirement
helps ensure that only those individuals who are morally culpable are criminally
punished.
¶ 63

At the same time, when a criminal statute implicates the First Amendment,
the presumption in favor of a heightened mens rea requirement also helps ensure
that the First Amendment protections enjoyed by all individuals remain vibrant. In
his partial concurrence, Justice Alito acknowledged this interaction between criminal
scienter requirements and First Amendment protections, noting the argument that
defining a threats statute in a manner “not limited to threats made with the intent
to harm[ ] will chill statements that do not qualify as true threats, e.g., statements
that may be literally threatening but are plainly not meant to be taken seriously.”
Elonis, 575 U.S. at 748 (Alito, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). In Justice
Alito’s view, “[r]equiring proof of recklessness” would strike a sufficient balance
between providing “adequate breathing space” for the exercise of First Amendment
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rights and preventing the conversion of “hurtful, valueless threats into protected
speech.” Id. The concerns Justice Alito identified have both common law and First
Amendment dimensions. There is a risk that individuals will lack notice that certain
speech acts could subject them to criminal punishment, and a risk that individuals
will engage in self-censorship to avoid treading past the inchoate boundaries of an
expansive criminal statute targeting speech. An intent requirement helps ensure that
all individuals can detect the boundary between protected and proscribable speech.
¶ 64

The principles at issue in Elonis, though couched in the common law, have
purchase in the First Amendment context. In my view, these principles strongly
imply that it would be impermissible to punish Taylor if he did not act with at least
reckless disregard towards the possibility that he was communicating a threat of
violence to District Attorney Welch. Without some scienter requirement, Taylor could
be convicted even if he were unaware he had engaged in the type of conduct N.C.G.S.
§ 14-16.7(a) criminalizes. Such a conviction would offend both common law and First
Amendment principles. Accordingly, I believe Elonis lends further support and
important context to the majority’s conclusion that true threats require proof of the
speaker’s subjective intent.
II.

¶ 65

A true threat is speech without constitutional value, but the
proliferation of true threats has constitutional salience.

The relevant precedents and First Amendment principles require the State to
prove Taylor’s subjective intent to threaten. Nevertheless, the scope of the true
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threats doctrine must not be too narrow because true threats can practically
undermine the values of freedom of speech and civic engagement that the First
Amendment serves.
¶ 66

One of the principal justifications for permitting the State to punish true
threats is its interest in “protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from the
disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence
will occur.” R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992). As R.A.V. indicates,
true threats may be regulated at least in part because of the reaction they engender
in the individual recipients of these threats and in the broader community. The
State’s interest in preventing that fear is not just a practical matter of public safety.
The reaction of recipients and the broader community to true threats is of significant
concern because the proliferation of true threats undermines that which the First
Amendment aspires to “grow[ ] and preserv[e],” our system of “democratic selfgovernance.” McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 489 (1985) (Brennan J., concurring).

¶ 67

If the cost of participating in public life is to be bombarded with serious threats
of violence towards one’s self and family, many people will choose to forego
contributing their voices to the “free exchange [that] facilitates an informed public
opinion, which, when transmitted to lawmakers, helps produce laws that reflect the
People’s will.” Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B. L. by & through Levy, 141 S. Ct. 2038,
2046 (2021); see also Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc., 290 F.3d at
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1086 (concluding that it “turns the First Amendment on its head” to protect threats
of violence because after being subjected to such a threat, victims “can no longer
participate in the debate” about a controversial issue). This degrades the
“marketplace of ideas” upon which “[o]ur representative democracy” depends. Id. As
a result, the public will be left without the benefit of “information [which] is a
precondition for public debate, which, in turn, is a precondition for democratic selfgovernance.” Hum. Life of Washington Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1022 (9th
Cir. 2010).
¶ 68

But true threats do more than dissuade others from contributing to the
“marketplace of ideas.” True threats interfere with the exercise of all the “cognate
rights” and “indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment.”
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). When true threats proliferate, the
attendant fear of imminent violence deters individuals from participating in the
institutions, processes, and everyday interactions through which Americans
endeavor to shape the course of collective life. Faced with the threat of retributory
violence, individuals may choose to forego exercising their rights to associate with
like-minded citizens, to publicly assemble in protest or support of existing policies, to
petition their government and public officials, or to publish their views for widespread
distribution. Because it is the exercise of these rights which “protect and nurture the
sort of active citizenship and collective action that have been the lifeblood of our
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system of government since its founding,” Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First
Amendment, 1098 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1097, 1123 (2016), the proliferation of true threats
is a danger to the vitality of our democracy.
¶ 69

True threats represent a particular First Amendment problem because of the
ways the specter of violence warps the processes from which our government derives
its legitimacy. Our nation’s and our state’s own history reveal how threats of violence
and actual violence have kept people from exercising democratic rights they formally
enjoyed. See, e.g., David Zucchino, Wilmington's Lie: The Murderous Coup of 1898
and the Rise of White Supremacy, Atlantic Monthly Press (2020). If our First
Amendment doctrines foster the proliferation of threats which make the reasonable
fear of imminent violence a pervasive feature of political life, the First Amendment
loses its point. R.A.V. also highlighted the concern that allowing threats of violence
to go unpunished would contribute to real-world violence. A First Amendment which
fosters political violence is self-defeating, because a society which settles political
disputes by resorting to violence—or a society which is forced to settle political
disputes in the looming shadow of violence—cannot function as a self-governing
democracy.

¶ 70

These realities highlight the risk that an overly narrow definition of what
constitutes a true threat will lend a cloak of legitimacy to methods of achieving
political change that are antithetical to everything the First Amendment stands for.
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At the same time, we must consider the First Amendment’s paramount interest in
fostering the free exchange of ideas, and the immense value to our system of
governance that this free exchange provides. Cf. United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S.
665, 720–21, (1972) (“[T]he wideopen and robust dissemination of ideas and
counterthought . . . is essential to the success of intelligent self-government.”)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). This interest may seem remote when the speech at issue
appears to most who encounter it to be crude, caustic, or fantastical, but our system
functions best when citizens are “active, collective, disrespectful, and even sometimes
incendiary.” Bhagwat at 1123; see also John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 228
(2010) (“[H]arsh criticism, short of unlawful action, is a price our people have
traditionally been willing to pay for self-governance.”) (Scalia, J., concurring).
¶ 71

Ultimately, this case is not about the State’s authority to punish individuals
who make true threats. That authority is uncontroverted. Instead, this case is about
distinguishing protected from proscribable speech. While I recognize that the
purposes the First Amendment serves require vigorous enforcement of statutes like
N.C.G.S. § 14-16.7(a), the majority has appropriately defined the scope of the true
threats doctrine. To prove a true threat, the State must prove both that the statement
in question contained an objective threat of violence and that the defendant intended
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to communicate a threatening message.2 Thus, I concur fully in Part II of the majority
opinion.
III.
¶ 72

The State presented insufficient evidence to support the conclusion
that Mr. Taylor communicated a true threat.
Although the majority correctly defines what constitutes a true threat, the

majority falters when tasked with applying its definition to the facts of this case.
Despite reciting the proper standard of review, the majority does not actually conduct
the requisite independent review of Taylor’s conviction.
¶ 73

As the United States Supreme Court has explained, when a defendant’s
conviction potentially violates the First Amendment, “an appellate court has an
obligation to make an independent examination of the whole record in order to make
sure that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free
expression.” Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984).

Practically speaking, it is worth noting that in many cases, it is unlikely that a
defendant who has conveyed a clear and unambiguous threat will be able to successfully
argue they did not intend to do so. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 503 (1987) (“In many
cases, the predicate facts conclusively establish intent, so that no rational jury could find that
the defendant committed the relevant criminal act but did not intend to cause injury.”). In
this context, when a communication is so “unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific
as to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of
execution,” then a defendant who understands the meaning of the words deployed will have
a difficult time disputing the reasonable inference that he or she intended to place the listener
in fear of imminent bodily harm. United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976);
see also United States v. Maxton, 940 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir. 1991) (“[M]ost of the time [a
defendant’s] intent [to threaten] can be gleaned from the very nature of the words used in
the communication; extrinsic evidence to prove an intent to threaten should only be necessary
when the threatening nature of the communication is ambiguous.”).
2
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The majority is correct that independent review “supplements rather than supplants”
the trial court’s role as a factfinder, in that we defer to the jury’s findings on historical
facts and its credibility determinations. In general, when reviewing pure questions of
fact, we take the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion
to dismiss on all factual issues. State v. Mason, 336 N.C. 595, 597, 444 S.E.2d 169,
169 (1994) (“In determining whether evidence is sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss, the evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the State. If there is
a conflict in the evidence, the resolution of the conflict is for the jury.”). As we
indicated in Desmond, the same should hold true when an appellate court applies
independent review. Desmond v. News & Observer Publ’g Co., 375 N.C. 21, 45, n.17,
reh’g denied, 376 N.C. 535 (2020). (“We emphasize that our discussion of the evidence
in this case is a reflection of the record as viewed in the light most favorable to
plaintiff and summarizes what the jury could permissibly have found as fact.”); Cf.
Veilleux v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 206 F.3d 92, 107 (1st Cir. 2000) (explaining that when
conducting independent review in a case implicating the First Amendment, “[p]urely
factual determinations, particularly those involving the credibility of witnesses,
remain best addressed by the factfinder, and are subject to the usual, more
deferential standard of review.”).
¶ 74

But the questions of whether Taylor’s statements contained an objective threat
of violence and whether he possessed an intent to threaten are mixed questions of
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constitutional law and fact. Cf. Butt v. State, 2017 UT 33, ¶ 29 (“The First
Amendment defense at issue involves a mixed determination of law and fact.”). On
questions of constitutional law, our review is “plenary.” Veilleux, 206 F.3d at 106. The
majority collapses this distinction. The appellate court must take the evidence in the
light most favorable to the State only with respect to disputed factual issues. For
example, the parties dispute whether District Attorney Welch’s actions after being
notified of Taylor’s posts evinced serious fear that reflected her contemporaneous
belief that Taylor would try to harm her. On this issue, where there is evidence in the
record supporting the State’s position including District Attorney Welch’s testimony,
we must presume that she did in fact fear for her personal safety and consider that
fact to the extent it is illustrative in the First Amendment analysis. Similarly, the
parties dispute whether Taylor wanted District Attorney Welch to see his Facebook
posts. Again, because there is evidence in the record supporting the State’s assertion
that Taylor did want District Attorney Welch to become aware of his statement, we
must adopt that fact at this stage of the proceedings.
¶ 75

However, this Court has a “constitutional responsibility” to decide the ultimate
question of whether the First Amendment permits Taylor to be convicted for violating
N.C.G.S. § 14-16.7(a) on these facts. Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 501. (“[T]he rule of
independent review assigns to judges a constitutional responsibility that cannot be
delegated to the trier of fact, whether the factfinding function be performed in the
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particular case by a jury or by a trial judge.”). Even if the defendant has been found
guilty of violating a statute criminalizing potentially protected First Amendment
activities, “our obligation is to make an independent examination of the whole record,
so as to assure ourselves that th[is] judgment does not constitute a forbidden
intrusion on the field of free expression.” Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Grp. Of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 567–68 (1995) (cleaned up); see also Veilleux, 206 F.3d at
106 (“Deference to the jury is muted, however, when free speech is implicated . . . .
Appellate courts—especially but not only the Supreme Court—have been assigned
this obligation in order to safeguard precious First Amendment liberties.”). Our task
is not, as the majority frames it, to decide if Taylor’s “statements would potentially
be reasonably regarded by a jury as constituting a true threat.” Our task is to decide
if, taking the evidence on disputed factual issues in the light most favorable to the
State, the jury could permissibly conclude that Taylor’s Facebook posts contained a
true threat consistent with applicable First Amendment principles. See Desmond, 375
N.C. at 44, n.16 (explaining that the goal of independent review in a libel case is “to
ascertain whether the record can permissibly and constitutionally support a finding
of actual malice”). By treating Taylor’s appeal as no different than any criminal
defendant’s appeal from a trial court’s motion to dismiss, the majority eschews an
obligation we are not entitled to ignore.
¶ 76

If, as the majority claims, “[t]he bar to survive a defendant’s motion to dismiss
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for insufficiency of the evidence is low,” then there is very little to prevent the State
from charging any individual who makes controversial or distasteful statements
under N.C.G.S. § 14-16.7(a) and bringing the case to trial.3 True, the defendant may
ultimately prevail and be found not guilty. But the prospect of facing a lengthy,
expensive trial is itself a deterrent to the free exercise of First Amendment rights.
Cf. Farah v. Esquire Mag., 736 F.3d 528, 534 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“[S]ummary
proceedings are essential in the First Amendment area because if a suit entails long
and expensive litigation, then the protective purpose of the First Amendment is
thwarted even if the defendant ultimately prevails.”) (cleaned up). Taylor has been
defending himself in this case for over five years and faces the prospect of still more
litigation should the State choose to try him again. The practical effect of the
majority’s failure to properly construe and apply the independent review standard
will be precisely the outcome the majority claims the First Amendment compels us to
avoid, the chilling of constitutionally protected speech.
¶ 77

Properly applying independent review, the State has failed to present
substantial evidence to sustain Taylor’s conviction on either the objective or
In fact, on appellate review of a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to dismiss,
“the reviewing court must determine whether there is substantial evidence of each essential
element of the offense and substantial evidence that the defendant was the perpetrator of the
offense.” State v. Smith, 307 N.C. 516, 518 (1983). The majority’s formulation that the “bar
. . . is low” appears to conflate the probable cause necessary to sustain an indictment with
the substantial evidence necessary to survive a motion to dismiss. Logically, these two
standards cannot be the same—if they were, there would be no point in allowing a defendant
to file a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence.
3
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subjective elements of the true threats doctrine.
1. The objective element
¶ 78

Although the majority claims it is assessing Taylor’s statements in their full
context, the majority instead isolates snippets of “strident language” which it
concludes “do not represent mere political hyperbole as a matter of law.” The problem
with the majority’s approach is that it fails to account for how the context surrounding
Taylor’s statements would have informed how a reasonable observer could have
interpreted the language he chose to deploy. A reasonable observer who viewed
Taylor’s Facebook posts in their full context could not understand his statements to
contain an objective threat of violence.

¶ 79

Even the statements Taylor made which most plausibly read to suggest the
possibility of actual violence—that District Attorney Welch “will be the first to go”
and that “[i]f [she] won’t do anything, then the death to her as well”—are not direct
threats of harm. Both statements are conditional. Whatever Taylor is implying he
will do is predicated on the occurrence of some antecedent event (a “rebellion against
our government,” District Attorney Welch refusing to “do anything” to prosecute
alleged criminals in Macon County), events which a reasonable person would not
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believe to be imminent or inevitable, at least at the time Taylor posted his messages.4
Given the context, no reasonably listener could infer that his hypothetical and
conditional statements were literal pronouncements of his intent to physically harm
District Attorney Welch.
¶ 80

Although Taylor did use language suggesting he might try to remedy perceived
injustices through something other than political advocacy, none of these statements
suggested he was planning to personally target District Attorney Welch with violent
acts. Taylor’s statements referencing violence included his promise to “open every
gun I have” should law enforcement raid his home; his declaration that he is “always
game” to “administer justice” because “[t]hey make new ammo everyday!”; his
response “If that what it takes” when his Facebook friend called for “vigilante justice”;
and his announcement that it was “time for old [t]ime m[ountain] justice,” which
Taylor would deliver “[r]egardless of what the law or courts say” because he was “tired
of this political bullshit.” None of these statements contain words threatening District
Attorney Welch specifically with actual violence. Further, a message advocating for

In assessing what meaning a reasonable person could glean from Taylor’s
statements, a court must assess the statements from the perspective of a reasonable person
who heard the statements at the time they were made, not a reasonable person who
encountered his statements today. In 2016, a reasonable person would likely have found the
prospect of a violent “rebellion against our government” far more remote than a reasonable
person would today, with knowledge of the events at the United States Capital on 6 January
2021. Cf. State v. Taylor, 270 N.C. App. 514, 570 (2020) (“Further, if D.A. Welch ‘will be the
first to go,’ it would only occur during a ‘rebellion against our government[.]’ The alleged
‘threat’ is contingent upon an event that no reasonable person would believe was ever likely
to occur.”).
4
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the use of violence to achieve political change is not the same as a message conveying
a serious expression of an intent to harm a specific person. Protected political speech
is not “remove[d] . . . from the protection of the First Amendment” merely because it
contains “advocacy of the use of force or violence.” N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware
Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 (1982). There is nothing in the posts connecting Taylor’s
apparent willingness to resort to violence to his comments about what would happen
to District Attorney Welch in the future if certain events were to occur. Taylor’s
messages reveal nothing more than the depth of his feeling regarding what he saw as
a grave injustice in Macon County.
¶ 81

Importantly, Taylor communicated his threats in the midst of a heated
discussion centered on political matters of significant concern to Taylor and his
Facebook friends. The fact that a statement was communicated in the middle of a
conversation regarding political issues is relevant when assessing what inferences an
observer could reasonably draw from language that is only ambiguously violent. That
Taylor “spoke his threatening words in the context of his political views” while a
perceived political crisis “was just unfolding” is relevant information a reasonable
listener would necessarily consider in ascertaining the meaning of Taylor’s remarks.
United States v. Olson, 629 F. Supp. 889, 894 (W.D. Mich. 1986). As is the fact that
Taylor removed the messages from his Facebook page shortly after posting them. The
majority errs in failing to account for this context.
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¶ 82

Notably absent from Taylor’s diatribe is any language supporting the
reasonable belief that he intended “to do anything specific to anyone at any particular
time.” Taylor, 270 N.C. App. at 569. As the Supreme Court of Colorado has explained,
the true threats inquiry “should include whether the threat contains accurate details
tending to heighten its credibility.” Colorado ex rel. R.D., 2020 CO 44, ¶ 53. Here,
Taylor did not specify a “date, time, and place” or method for where and how he
intended to carry out his purported threat. Cf. United States v. Callahan, 702 F.2d
964, 966 (11th Cir. 1983). The majority points to nothing which would lead a
reasonable listener to conclude that Taylor had considered acting on these supposed
threats.5 Cf. United States v. Ivers, 967 F.3d 709, 717 (8th Cir. 2020) (finding
sufficient evidence to support a threats conviction where defendant stated “[y]ou don't
know the 50 different ways I planned to kill [the victim]”).

¶ 83

Other courts have accorded significant weight to the presence or absence of
such details in examining whether a defendant’s statements could reasonably be
construed as an objective threat. For example, the Supreme Court of Washington
concluded that there “was ample evidence from which a reasonable jury could
determine that [a defendant’s] threats were ‘true threats,’ ” State v. Schaler, 169

To be clear, the State need not prove Taylor intended to carry out the threatened
act in order to prove he communicated a true threat. I raise this point only to demonstrate
why a reasonable observer could not understand these statements as containing threats of
imminent violence.
5
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Wash. 2d 274, 291 (2010), based in part on the fact that defendant “specifically said
that ‘he wanted to kill them with his bare hands, by strangulation,’ ” “repeated his
desire to kill his neighbors” on multiple occasions, and had previously threatened his
neighbors with a chain saw, id. at 280.
¶ 84

By contrast, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the
evidence was insufficient to convict a defendant who posted a photograph of himself
holding a gun with the caption “[m]ake no mistake of my will to succeed in bringing
you two idiots to justice,” because “nothing else about that image suggests a clear
intent to commit violence.” Massachusetts v. Walters, 472 Mass. 680, 695 (2015).
Here, although Taylor’s posts may have “come across as vaguely ominous or
disturbing,” id., they do not give rise to the reasonable inference that Taylor intended
to physically harm District Attorney Welch. Additionally, Taylor and District
Attorney Welch previously maintained a cordial relationship, and there was no
evidence indicating Taylor had a propensity for engaging in violent conduct. Cf. In re
S.W., 45 A.3d 151, 160 (D.C. 2012) (concluding that even “facially threatening words”
could not be “reasonably and objectively perceived as communicating a threat” when
“placed in the context of [the defendant and the purported victim’s] acknowledged
and unaltered friendship . . . and [the defendant’s] manner of delivery”). Again, all
this context which the majority ignores is relevant in assessing the meaning a
reasonable person could draw from Taylor’s posts.
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¶ 85

The reaction of the individuals who interacted with Taylor’s posts while his
diatribe was unfolding is particularly telling. For example in Watts, the Supreme
Court thought it notable that “[the defendant] and the crowd laughed after the
[purported threat] was made.” Watts, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969). This emphasis on the
reactions of those actively participating in the broader exchange within which the
purported threats were communicated reflects the commonsense intuition that the
actual and intended recipients of a message are in the best position to discern its
meaning. See, e.g., D.M. ex rel. D.J.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d
754, 764 (8th Cir. 2011) (“The reaction of those who read [the speaker’s] messages is
evidence that his statements were understood as true threats. [The recipient]
contacted . . . a trusted adult, to discuss what in her words was ‘something serious.’ ”).
As the Court of Appeals explained,
Defendant was engaging in a heated discussion, or
“debate,” about a political concern with his Facebook
friends, which was emotionally charged due to the content
of the discussion, a dead child, as well as shared feelings,
very likely incorrect, that D.A. Welch improperly declined
to prosecute the parents. Facebook has the status of a
“public square,” but can feel like a “safer” place to discuss
controversial topics or make inappropriate, hyperbolic, or
boastful statements. The audience is generally known to
the person posting, and there is often a sense of community
and like-mindedness. The record evidence is that every
response to Defendant's posts on Facebook was supportive
of Defendant's comments. None of the responses on
Facebook indicated concern that Defendant might be
planning to kill D.A. Welch. By posting on Facebook,
Defendant was expressing his feelings publicly, but
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selectively, in the “most important place[ ] ... for the
exchange of views.”
¶ 86

State v. Taylor, 270 N.C. App. 514, 578–79 (alterations in original) (quoting
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735–36 (2017)). None of the active
participants in this conversation said or did anything reflecting even a modicum of
concern that Taylor was imminently planning to physically harm District Attorney
Welch. The only person who did find Taylor’s messages concerning—the detective in
the Macon County Sheriff’s Office—was an “unintended recipient[ ]” who “stumble[d]
upon” the posts, not someone whose reaction is illustrative of what a reasonable
person would conclude with full knowledge of the surrounding context. Colorado
ex rel. R.D., 2020 CO 44 at ¶ 60.

¶ 87

Taking this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a reasonable
person who encountered Taylor’s statements—and who was familiar with the context
in which they were made—could, at most, conclude that Taylor communicated a
statement containing an ambiguous, allusive threat of violence to be carried out in
some unknown way, by some unknown person, at some unknown time, after the
occurrence of two vaguely defined events which may or may not have ever occurred.
That is not the kind of statement the First Amendment allows the State to criminally
punish. In my view, even when all disputed factual issues are taken in the light most
favorable to the State, a jury could not have found that Taylor communicated a
message that a reasonable person would interpret as a threat to harm District

STATE V. TAYLOR
2021-NCSC-164
Earls, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part

Attorney Welch consistent with First Amendment principles.
2. The subjective element
¶ 88

The majority also errs in concluding that there is substantial evidence to
support the conclusion that Taylor possessed a subjective intent to threaten District
Attorney Welch.

¶ 89

“Intent is a mental attitude seldom provable by direct evidence. It must
ordinarily be proved by circumstances from which it may be inferred.” State v. Bell,
285 N.C. 746, 750 (1974). Here, the circumstances overwhelmingly and exclusively
support the conclusion that Taylor intended to communicate his outrage over what
he saw as District Attorney Welch’s (and the broader criminal justice system’s)
malfeasance, not to threaten District Attorney Welch with violence. As described
above, I do not believe Taylor’s indirect language is itself indicative of any intent to
threaten. Neither is the context in which the purported threats were communicated.
Taylor’s boastful, hyperbolic string of Facebook posts, which he quickly deleted,
supports the conclusion that he was blowing off steam, not that he was seeking to
make District Attorney Welch fear impending bodily harm. The fact that he chose
profane, offensive, and opprobrious words to communicate his message does not
convert what can only be understood as a “crude offensive method of stating a political
opposition to” District Attorney Welch’s actions into a true threat against her life.
Watts, 394 U.S. at 707.
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¶ 90

Taylor’s actions after communicating the statements are also relevant in
assessing his subjective intent. Cf. State v. Biggs, 224 N.C. 722, 726 (1944) (“[P]roof
of the commission of like offenses may be competent to show intent, design, guilty
knowledge, or identity of person or crime. This rule applies equally to evidence of like
offenses committed subsequent to the offense charged.”) (citation omitted). His
actions provide no support for the inference that he intended to threaten District
Attorney Welch.

¶ 91

First, Taylor deleted his Facebook posts shortly after they were published.
Second, Taylor was fully cooperative with law enforcement investigators and
immediately disclaimed any intent to threaten District Attorney Welch when
questioned by the SBI. Cf. Ivers, 967 F.3d at 719 (“[W]hen deputy marshals later
confronted [the defendant] about the [purported threat], he initially refused to speak
with them; shouted at them; referred to [the victim] by a racial epithet; . . . and
confirmed that he remained ‘crazy fucking angry.’ ”). Third, Taylor tried to apologize
to District Attorney Welch as soon as he learned his messages had caused her
distress. Cf. State v. Trey M., 186 Wash. 2d 884, 907 (2016) (“[The defendant’s] failure
to acknowledge that shooting the boys would be wrong [ ] argue[s] in favor of this
being a true threat. Further, [the defendant] repeated his plan to kill the boys to [the
investigating officer], who also testified regarding the plan's depth of detail, [the
defendant’s] demeanor, and [the defendant’s] absence of misgivings about what he
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was planning.”). While it is possible that a defendant could act with a fleeting intent
to threaten violence, there is not “relevant evidence that a reasonable person might
accept as adequate” to support the conclusion Taylor intended to threaten District
Attorney Welch at the time he published his posts. State v. Garcia, 358 N.C. 382, 412
(2004).
¶ 92

The evidence the State relies upon in challenging this conclusion is minimal.
According to the State, the evidence Taylor intended to threaten District Attorney
Welch with death or bodily harm is that he described his posts as threats, he texted
a friend his posts might get him in “[t]rouble with the law,” and he asked his Facebook
friends to “share” his posts on District Attorney Welch’s Facebook page. As the Court
of Appeals correctly observed, none of this evidence is evidence supporting the
reasonable inference that Taylor “had the specific intent to threaten D.A. Welch, i.e.,
that Defendant intended D.A. Welch to believe he was actually planning to kill her.”
Taylor, 270 N.C. App. at 569–70.

¶ 93

Assuming the evidence does support the inference that Taylor considered his
posts to be “threats”—and that he wanted District Attorney Welch to learn of his
posts—these inferences do not answer the question of what message Taylor believed
the threats contained which he hoped District Attorney Welch would receive. Not all
threats are criminally proscribable. The content of what is being threatened matters.
Had Taylor posted a message promising that if District Attorney Welch did not
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prosecute the parents of the children who died he would organize nightly protests
outside of her house, or a message promising to run against District Attorney Welch
in a future election if she did not change course, it might be reasonable to conclude
Taylor communicated a threat with the intent to instill fear. Yet, obviously, in neither
of these circumstances would it be possible to conclude Taylor communicated a threat
against District Attorney Welch in a manner which satisfies the elements of the true
threats analysis.
¶ 94

Similarly, Taylor’s apparent belief that his posts might lead to attention from
law enforcement is not, in this context, evidence of Taylor’s subjective intent to
threaten. Read together, Taylor’s messages reflect his profound distrust in Macon
County’s law enforcement officials and its judicial system. His text to a friend that
his posts might get him in “trouble” is indicative of his beliefs about local law
enforcement. There is no evidence supporting the conclusion that Taylor believed he
would get in “[t]rouble with the law” because he knew he had just threatened District
Attorney Welch’s life.

¶ 95

The evidence presented by the State supports nothing more than “mere
speculation or conjecture” that Taylor communicated his messages with the specific
intent of threatening District Attorney Welch. State v. Polke, 361 N.C. 65, 72 (2006).
Holding the State to its burden is especially important where, as in this case, failure
to do so can chill protected speech and therefore comes at the cost of all North
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Carolinians’ First Amendment rights. Absent substantial evidence of Taylor’s intent
to threaten District Attorney Welch, the majority disserves the First Amendment
principles it purports to uphold by speculatively reaching for a conclusion the
evidence does not reasonably support. Therefore, I dissent from the portion of the
majority opinion holding that the State has presented substantial evidence to support
the conclusion that Taylor communicated a true threat to District Attorney Welch.

